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Abstract
This article examines the views of Adam Smith on the philosophy and provision 
of education. On the basis of his Theory of Moral Sentiments and other writings, 
it becomes clear that Smith views education, conceived broadly to include both 
the learning of ‘wisdom’ and ‘moral sentiments’, as central to a prosperous or 
flourishing society. Education, in Smith’s view, is not restricted to formal institutions 
of education but also includes social learning—that between parents and children, 
and the learning arising from friendships. For Smith, education is a social process. 
Smith also discusses the important role of wonder and surprise in the process of 
education. The provision of education, as outlined in his Wealth of Nations, largely 
supports the public provision of education with partial contributions from the 
enrolled students. Smith favoured education for all because he believed that it 
would offset the harmful effects of division of labour on the workers, and therefore, 
education had to be accessible to the workers. The essay concludes by reiterating 
Smith’s position that education for all is necessary to create a prosperous society.
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I
Adam Smith, the professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, is 
famous for his work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
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Nations (1776), a foundational treatise on political economy. However, this is not 
his first published book. Smith’s first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 
hereafter) (Raphael & Macfie, 1976), was published in 1759. TMS is a normative 
work on human sentiments and their importance to a society that aims to flourish. 
Related aspects are found in other works of Smith: lectures on the History of 
Astronomy, Lectures on Jurisprudence and Lectures on Rhetoric. Both ‘educa-
tion’ and ‘flourish’ warrant a definition at the outset because their interpretation in 
this paper is sufficiently non-usual. Education refers not only to the imparting of 
skills and ideas in a systematic form but also to the wider learning of morals as 
well as the process of knowledge acquisition. To ‘flourish’ is to ‘prosper’ (TMS, 
p. 313; for Smith’s uses of ‘flourish’ in TMS, see pp. 88, 153, 281, 285).
Smith’s views on education, as Rothschild informs us, ‘were a continuing 
standard for successive programmes of educational reform of the revolutionary 
period, both in England and in France. Condorcet invoked Smith in his first plan 
of universal public instruction of 1788…’ (Rothschild, 1998, p. 208). That is, his 
views have been employed in the reform of education. The present essay revisits 
Smith’s oeuvre to find aspects of education which are of enduring value. An account 
of Smith’s philosophy of education is presented first. This is followed by Smith’s 
views on the provision of education. Smith takes up the latter issue in some detail 
in Book V of the Wealth of Nations (Campbell, Skinner & Todd, 1976) (WN here-
after). The core aspects of Smith’s philosophy and provision of education is sum-
marized in the concluding section. In particular, the role of education in the 
attainment of a flourishing society is underscored.
II
Jack Weinstein, the guest editor of the symposium1 ‘Adam Smith and Education’, 
interprets Smith’s ‘philosophy of education’ found scattered across his oeuvre as 
strongly aligning with ‘nurture’ and not with ‘nature’.2 The present essay supports 
Weinstein’s interpretation. In the following extracts from TMS, Smith points out 
how nature ‘teaches’ humans sympathetic behaviour.
Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen another, 
that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally concerned. That 
imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but momen-
tary. (TMS, p. 21)
 In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the cir-
cumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some meas-
ure to assume those of the spectators. (TMS, p. 22)
Smith outlines the theory of sympathy (a ‘moral sentiment’) formation in TMS. 
Even though the ‘desire to sympathise’ is natural for Smith (Weinstein, 2007, p. 60), 
the how and when to sympathize requires learning, or broadly, education.3 This is 
the central point. Education is not a one-off activity or affair. It calls for continu-
ous and often repeated rounds of learning and unlearning. As Smith observes in 
the context of the formation of moral sentiments, ‘[o]ur continual observations 
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upon the conduct of others insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general 
rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided. Some 
of their actions shock all our natural sentiments’ (TMS, p. 159, emphasis added). 
Or, as he writes in another instance, ‘[t]hose general rules of conduct, when they 
have been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting 
the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in 
our particular situation’ (TMS, p. 160, emphasis added). These excerpts point to 
the idea that moral sentiments can be learnt or nurtured. Berry expresses the same 
view in his entry entitled ‘Smith and Science’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
Adam Smith: 
A pervasive theme in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that morality is a learnt 
phenomenon…moral behaviour is an effect of socialisation and thus exhibits the traits 
of soft determinism.… The fact that it is habitual…means that, building on the given 
natural dynamics of human nature, it is a learnt resource. (Berry, 2006, p. 133)
What are the ‘qualities’ Smith considers most important for an individual? His 
answer: ‘reason’ and ‘self-command’, the ‘union’ of which brings about ‘prudence’—
care, concern, and good judgement about the present and future.
The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason and understand-
ing, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, 
and of foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them; and, 
secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or 
to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in 
some future time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of 
all the virtues, that which is most useful to the individual. (TMS, p. 189)
In other words, ‘reason’ alone is not sufficient in the education of an individual. 
The learning of moral sentiments, according to Smith, is also important. The society 
flourishes4 when its members possess good moral sentiments.
All the members of human society stand in need of each other’s assistance, and are 
likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally 
afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes 
and is happy. All the different members of it are bound together by the agreeable bands 
of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good 
offices. (TMS, p. 85, emphasis added)
The core of a flourishing and happy society is therefore care—to ‘stand in need of 
each other’s assistance’ and the reciprocity arising from love, gratitude and friend-
ship. Developing moral sentiments is, therefore, as important as studying reason, 
and the former cannot be reduced to the latter: ‘it is altogether absurd and unintel-
ligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from 
reason’ (TMS, p. 32). In short, ‘the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue’ are 
both equally important (TMS, p. 62). Education, not narrowly conceived as the 
development of reason, but broadly defined to include also the learning of 
socially useful values—benevolence, care, sympathy and virtue, to name a few—
therefore contributes to the formation of a flourishing society.
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TMS discusses a wide range of moral sentiments besides sympathy: ‘amiable and 
respectable virtues’, ‘unsocial passions’, ‘social passions’, ‘selfish passions’ and 
‘ambition’ in part I of the book; ‘gratitude and resentment’, ‘justice’ and ‘remorse’ 
in part II; ‘self-approbation’, ‘self-disapprobation’, ‘praise-worthiness’, ‘blame-
worthiness’ and ‘duty’ in part III; and ‘virtue’, ‘benevolence’ and ‘self-command’ in 
part VI. Smith presents his theory of moral sentiments through the concept of the 
‘impartial spectator’—‘a peculiar power of perception, called a moral sense’ (TMS, 
p. 266; cf. pp. 164–165). Or, as he writes elsewhere: ‘[i]t is reason, principle, con-
science, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of 
our conduct’ (TMS, p. 137). For Smith, conscience ‘is a product of social relation-
ship’ (Raphael & Macfie, 1976, p. 15). The formation of moral sentiments of a good 
nature can and has to be inculcated.
Smith also advises caution because he states that moral sentiments are liable of 
being corrupted, particularly by the principles of ‘custom and fashion’ (TMS, 
p. 194; cf. p. 195). It is perhaps in this context that he criticizes boarding schools 
and schools run by nuns for boys, young men and young ladies ‘in the higher 
ranks of life to have hurt most essentially the domestic morals’ and encourages 
their parents to educate them in their own houses (TMS, p. 222).5 Note that Smith’s 
education is a broadly conceived one and not one restricted to formal institutions 
like schools and universities. Another aspect Smith discusses is the affection bet-
ween parents and their children. Although the affection is natural, because of the 
possibility that the behaviour of the child may have adverse effects on other chil-
dren in the future, the affective tendencies require to be nurtured and learnt.6 In his 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith writes:
The long time that children are dependent on their parents and unable to subsist by 
themselves…[is] productive of the most salutary effects. During all this time the child 
being dependent on the parents is obliged in many instances to yield its will to theirs, to 
bring down its passions and curb its desires to such a pitch as they can go along with, 
and by this means learns in its very infancy a chief and most essentiall part of educa-
tion, without which being first implanted it would be in vain to attempt the instilling of 
any others. This is one of the most necessary lessons one can acquire. (p. 141, the extra 
‘l’ in ‘essentiall’ is Smith’s own and in the original)
According to Smith, moral sentiments—those of passion and desire—can be and 
ought to be imparted during early childhood (cf. Fleischacker, 2013, pp. 491–
492). In the same Lectures, Smith reiterates the importance of early childhood 
education by parents: ‘that children have so long a dependance upon their parents, 
to bring down their passions to theirs, and thus be trained up at length to become 
usefull members of society. Every child gets this piece of education, even under 
the most worthless parent’ (p. 438). Surprisingly, he believes that every child gets 
such education.
While critically reviewing the different systems of moral philosophy in part VII 
of TMS, Smith notes that the aim of the theory of moral sentiments present in the 
different systems is ‘to encourage the best and most laudable habits of the human 
mind’ (TMS, p. 307). Smith further describes the ‘most laudable habits of the 
human mind’ which can be learnt from the different systems of moral philosophy.
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We may learn from each of them something that is both valuable and peculiar. If it were 
possible, by precept and exhortation, to inspire the mind with fortitude and magna-
nimity, the ancient systems of propriety would seem sufficient to do this. Or if it were 
possible, by the same means, to soften it into humanity, and to awaken the affections of 
kindness and general love towards those we live with, some of the pictures with which 
the benevolent system presents us, might seem capable of producing this effect. (TMS, 
p. 307, emphases added)
Notice the use of ‘inspire’, ‘soften’ and ‘awaken’, all of them critical to the 
process of learning and the development of knowledge. Similarly, in his lectures 
entitled ‘The History of Astronomy’ (published in his Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects [pp. 33–105]), Smith discusses the effects of ‘wonder’, ‘surprise’ and 
‘admiration’. Smith describes ‘wonder’ in the following way: ‘It is this fluctua-
tion and vain recollection, together with the emotion or movement of the spirits 
that they excite, which constitute the sentiment properly called Wonder’ (p. 39, 
emphasis in original). Smith talks about how the viewing of certain natural objects 
generates wonder: ‘[w]e wonder at all extraordinary and uncommon objects, at all 
the rarer phaenomena of nature, at meteors, comets, eclipses, at singular plants 
and animals, and at every thing, in short, with which we have before been either 
little or not at all acquainted; and we still wonder, though forewarned of what we 
are to see’ (p. 33). Of course, Smith does not explicitly connect these sentiments 
with education or the process of learning; nevertheless, he is discussing these 
sentiments in the context of how scientific knowledge develops and is, therefore, 
of significance to education and more so, in the process of learning.
In Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres,7 a set of lectures on 
language—more accurately, on rhetoric—he talks about how best to communi-
cate an idea: 
Another thing that is necessary is that the description should be short and not 
taedious by its length. But here there is a difficulty, to attain this conciseness and at the 
same time bring in those circumstances which give a description vivaciety and force. 
This may often be accomplished by picking out some of the most curious and striking 
circumstances, which may suggest the others to the reader. (pp. 71–72; cf. Weinstein, 
2007, p. 59)
Communicating an idea well is important in education as it is a space where ideas are 
disseminated.
Smith’s philosophy of education may now be summarized. First, the aims of 
education, broadly understood, is the flourishing of all members in a society. 
Second, to achieve these aims, the members of the society must be educated in the 
appropriate moral sentiments besides ‘the study of wisdom’ (TMS, p. 62) through 
formal educational institutions and through wider social interactions, such as 
parenting, friendships and other social relations. As Tegos writes while discussing 
the importance of moral imagination in Smith, the ‘moral deliberation of ordinary 
citizens is contingent on the ongoing process of sharpening the moral imagina-
tion, itself a product of the inextricably linked moral and intellectual faculties and 
their subsequent cultivation through an educational policy’ (Tegos, 2013, p. 363). 
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That is, Smith’s philosophy of education requires to be translated into practice 
through an educational policy which is in line with his philosophy. In the next 
section, Smith’s views on how to provide education to the members of a commu-
nity are presented.
III
Smith does not view education as a ‘commodity’ where the forces of demand and 
supply determines its availability (quantity) and accessibility (price). Education, 
being central to the attainment of a flourishing society, could not possibly be 
entirely left to the market forces. Smith treats the issue of provision of education 
at some length in Book V, entitled ‘Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or the 
Commonwealth’, of the WN. Both West (1964) and Skinner (1996) have written 
about the provision of education in Adam Smith. West interprets Smith as pos-
sessing a strong preference for ‘the operation of market forces in providing educa-
tion’ (West, 1964, p. 465). However, Skinner argues, in line with our interpretation, 
that Smith preferred ‘a combination of modest private, and a more significant 
public, contribution’ in the case of elementary education (Skinner, 1996, p. 200). 
Neither West nor Skinner includes ‘moral sentiments’ as an important component 
of education in Smith.
According to Smith, the provision of the following services falls under the 
ambit of the government: law and justice, defence, public works—particularly 
transport infrastructure—and education (WN, pp. 814–815; cf. Aspromourgos, 
2009, p. 227). How should education be financed?
The expence of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is likewise, no 
doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed 
by the general contribution of the whole society. This expence, however, might perhaps 
with equal propriety, and even with some advantage, be defrayed altogether by those 
who receive the immediate benefit of such education and instruction, or by the volun-
tary contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other. 
(WN, p. 815)
In the above passage, Smith also offers suggestions on the collective ways of 
financing the expenses necessary for the provision of education (religious instruc-
tion included). Note that Smith advocates that the costs of education be partially 
borne by the users. Smith’s position on user charges for education is based on the 
comparative performance of Scottish and English education. The Scottish educa-
tion system, where the teachers’ salaries were borne by the students, performed 
better than the English education system, where wealthy benefactors financed the 
costs of education through endowments (West, 1964, p. 465). As Smith writes, 
‘[i]n the university of Oxford, the greater part of the publick professors have, for 
these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching’ (WN, p. 761). 
Some pages later, Smith notes that ‘[i]n general, the richest and best endowed 
universities have been the slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most 
averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education’ 
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(WN, p. 772). In the English education system, over time, the interests of the 
administrators took precedence over that of the benefactors, whereas in the 
Scottish education system, because the incomes of the teachers were dependent 
on the number of students, the teaching corresponded to the wishes of the students 
and their parents (West, 1964, pp. 465–466). Smith provides the reason for the 
difference in the Scottish and English education systems in the following excerpt.
The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished more or less the 
necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence, so far as it arises from their 
salaries, is evidently derived from a fund altogether independent of their success and 
reputation in their particular professions. (WN, p. 760)
The endowment, it must be noted, ‘arises chiefly from some local or provincial 
revenue, from the rent of some landed estate, or from the interest of some sum of 
money allotted and put under the management of trustees for this particular 
purpose, sometimes by the sovereign himself, and sometimes by some private 
donor’ (WN, p. 759). Therefore, for Smith, the issue was not one of public versus 
private financing of education but one of endowment-based versus user-charge-
based financing of education. Smith favoured the user-charge-based system of 
financing and he maintained that the user charge ought to be affordable for all.
After recognizing the existence of inequality of education in the society, with 
those of higher ‘rank’ and status being more educated than the rest, Smith pre-
scribes the following.
For a very small expence the publick can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose 
upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essen-
tial parts of education. (WN, p. 785)
The ‘most essential parts of education’, according to Smith, are the capacities ‘to 
read, write, and account’ (WN, p. 785). Although Smith advocates user charges for 
education, the charges should be such that ‘even a common labourer may afford 
it’ (WN, p. 785). Smith’s proposition that education should be affordable even to 
the common labourer is sufficient to reject the view that he favoured unrestricted 
competition in education. As Skinner writes, ‘Smith advocated a policy that would 
encourage the poor to send their children to school, but also that he supported 
compulsion’ because the poor ‘typically lacked either incentive or inclination to 
provide an education for their children’ (Skinner, 1996, p. 194). Smith argues that 
educating the ‘inferior ranks of people’ is advantageous to the state.
The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and 
superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful dis-
orders. An instructed and intelligent people besides are always more decent and orderly 
than an ignorant and stupid one.… In free countries, where the safety of government 
depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its 
conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to 
judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.8 (WN, p. 788)
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Since education is about imparting reason as well as self-command (understand-
ing how to feel and behave), it is expected to make people ‘more decent and 
orderly’. Not just that, in countries where people determine who forms the govern-
ment, the voter ought to be able to make informed judgements on economic, 
political and social matters (cf. Skinner, 1996, p. 195).
Another reason for the public provision of education arises from Smith’s 
concerns about the debilitating effects of division of labour, which he considers 
essential for economic growth in particular and liberal capitalism in general. 
The advantage and disadvantage of division of labour to the society are visible 
from the following two passages from the Wealth of Nations.
THE greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of 
the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem 
to have been the effects of the division of labour. (WN, p. 13)
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those 
who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few 
very simple operations; frequently to one or two. … He naturally loses, therefore, the 
habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as is possible for 
a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of 
relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, 
noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning 
many even of the ordinary duties of private life. (WN, pp. 781–782)
Smith is unequivocal that ‘in every improved and civilized society this is the state 
into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessar-
ily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it’ (WN, p. 782). Hence, 
‘[t]he education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and com-
mercial society, the attention of the publick…’ (WN, p. 784). The public provision 
of education, Smith suggests, will partly offset the negative consequences arising 
from the division of labour (cf. Skinner, 1996, p. 195; Rothschild & Sen, 2006, p. 
352; Aspromourgos, 2013, p. 268). As Aspromourgos (2013, p. 268) writes, and 
rightly so, the suggestion of public education in the Wealth of Nations ‘is evidence 
of Smith’s not being an ideologue for liberal capitalism: he is not prepared to sup-
press this undesirable consequence of economic development’. Insofar as this is 
the case, the provision of some services under Smith’s ‘unproductive sector’ will 
require to be provided, and that too at an increasing rate (see also the discussion 
at Aspromourgos, 2009, p. 264). Also, Smith’s use of ‘unproductive’ should not 
be taken to mean ‘unnecessary’ or ‘undesirable’ from the point of view of the 
society as a whole. As Aspromourgos (2013, p. 283) puts it: ‘the role proposed for 
government in education—compulsory education, it may be noted—makes that 
activity at least partly “productive” in Smith’s strict sense, insofar as labour skills 
are an element of society’s “capital”, as he understands it.’
Yet another reason for the public provision of education, particularly for the 
majority of the people (the workers), in the society may be the following. Smith 
believes that liberal capitalism will result in a rise in real wages, although there 
are no forces in his theory that will generate this result (cf. Aspromourgos, 2009, 
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p. 188, pp. 213–214; Thomas, 2015, pp. 78–79). For Smith, real wages are deter-
mined by the relative bargaining power of the workers vis-à-vis the employers 
and the socio-political situation. In other words, the extant real wage, according to 
Smith, is very much a product of history—of workers coming together to bargain 
for higher wages and of the employers resisting higher wages. Perhaps Smith, like 
his contemporary, James Steuart,9 also believed that ‘education’ of the workers 
will improve their real wages (Thomas, 2015, p. 58). Nowhere does Smith make 
this connection, but the elements necessary for such a connection are in Smith, 
notably in his theory of wages. After all, real wages in Smith depend on subsist-
ence which is considered customary by the workers.
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably neces-
sary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent 
for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. … Under necessaries 
therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which 
the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. 
(WN, pp. 869–870)
Perhaps education could raise the level of customary subsistence. If education is 
broadly defined (as in section II) to include moral sentiments also, then the 
positive connection between education and real wages is stronger. In her book on 
the theory of wages in classical economics, Stirati observes that in Smith, ‘through 
social interchange and historical experience, widespread opinions form as to what 
is the decorous level of consumption even for “the lowest rank of people”, which 
the wages of an adult worker should be able to provide’ (Stirati, 1994, pp. 59–60).
Not only does Smith favour the public provision of education with private 
contributions, he also suggests that education be made compulsory, especially for 
workers. One reason for this, explicit in Smith, is that education will partly offset 
the debilitating effects of division of labour, a central feature of liberal capitalism. 
Another reason, only implicit in Smith, is that education may lead to rising real 
wages, a tendency which Smith believes liberal capitalism will bring about. 
Yet another reason is that education makes the society more informed and judi-
cious and, therefore, contributes to the ‘safety of the government’. To use latter-
day terms, education improves the functioning of democratic processes by 
enabling the society to make informed decisions in their role as citizens. The 
following passage from Viner summarizes well our preceding discussion.
Smith supports the participation of the government in the general education of the 
people, because it will help prepare them for industry, will make them better citizens 
and better soldiers, and happier and healthier men in mind and body. Public education 
is made necessary to check as far as may be the evil effects on the standards, mentality, 
and character of the working classes of the division of labor and the inequality in the 
distribution of wealth. (Viner, 1927, p. 227)
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IV
Underlying Adam Smith’s views on the philosophy of and provision of education 
is his normative idea of a society: one where all the members are flourishing. 
Education, for Smith, is not narrowly defined, but is a broad conception—which 
includes the ‘study of wisdom’ as well as that of ‘moral sentiments’. Smith recog-
nizes that the inequalities in education almost always closely correspond with the 
inequalities in income and wealth. Smith believes that education can lead to an 
improvement in the lives of the poor. In addition, he believes that education can 
partially offset the ill effects on workers brought about by division of labour. 
As for the provision of education, Smith favours a user-charge-based system to an 
endowment-based system. Although Smith advocates user charges for education, 
the charges should be such that ‘even a common labourer may afford it’ (WN, 
p. 785), a proposition that does not support the view that Smith favoured un-
restricted competition in education. Moreover, Smith strongly believed that educa-
tion for the ‘common people requires…the attention of the publick’ (WN, p. 784). 
Smith’s position on the provision of education is not only nuanced but also 
contextual: 
In some cases the state of the society necessarily places the greater part of individuals in 
such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almost 
all the abilities and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps can admit of. In other 
cases the state of the society does not place the greater part of individuals in such situ-
ations, and some attention of government is necessary in order to prevent the almost 
entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people. (WN, p. 781) 
It is the case, as Smith recognized in the eighteenth century, that the development 
of conceptual frameworks based on observation and reason alongside the devel-
opment of benevolence, care, sympathy and virtue will enable all of us to flourish 
or prosper.
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Notes
1. Other papers in the symposium deal with ‘Adam Smith and French Ideas on Education’, 
‘Adam Smith as a Teacher on Classical Subjects’, ‘Adam Smith’s (Weak) Case for Fee 
Incomes for University Faculty and Student-consumer Sovereignty’ and ‘Dr Smith and 
the Moderns: Adam Smith and the Development of Human Capital Theory’, all pub-
lished in V. Brown (2007).
2. See Aspromourgos (2009, pp. 44–48) for a detailed account of Smith’s use of ‘natural’ 
across all his works.
3. Smith use of ‘education’ in TMS usually goes along with an adjective. For instance, 
‘most vulgar education’ (p. 139), ‘most artificial and refined education’ (p. 139), ‘educa-
tion has been very singular’ (p. 160) and ‘virtuously educated’ (p. 162). These can be 
taken to indicate that, based on his theory of moral sentiments, Smith distinguished 
between good and bad education.
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4. But note that Smith’s view arises from ‘the Stoic idea of harmonious system, seen in the 
working of society’ (Raphael & Macfie, 1976, p. 7). Smith describes it thus: ‘[h]uman 
society, when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light, appears 
like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce 
a thousand agreeable effects’ (TMS, p. 316).
5. Smith goes as far as saying that ‘[d]omestic education is the institution of nature— 
public education the contrivance of man. It is surely unnecessary to say which is likely 
to be the wisest’ (TMS, p. 222).
6. The complete passage of Smith, evocative of moral values, particularly the reciprocity 
of affection between the children and their old parents deserves to be quoted in full.
In ordinary cases, the existence and preservation of the child depend altogether 
upon the care of the parents. Those of the parents seldom depend upon that of the 
child. Nature, therefore, has rendered the former affection so strong, that it generally 
requires not to be excited, but to be moderated; and moralists seldom endeavour to 
teach us how to indulge, but generally how to restrain our fondness, our excessive 
attachment, the unjust preference which we are disposed to give to our own children 
above those of other people. They exhort us, on the contrary, to an affectionate atten-
tion to our parents, and to make a proper return to them in their old age for the kind-
ness which they had shown to us in our infancy and youth. (TMS, p. 142)
7. Delivered in Edinburgh from 1748 to 1751, Court (1985, p. 325) writes that these were 
‘the first formal lectures on the subject of “English” in Britain to give singular pedagog-
ical prominence to the application of selections from English literature in the university 
classroom’. Court argues that Smith considered ‘belles lettres’, the study of litera-
ture, as being capable of instilling in people good moral sentiments (see Court, 1985, 
pp. 329–330, 337; cf. Griswold, 2006, p. 26).
8. Some pages later, Smith discusses the unsocial morals found in ‘little religious sects’ of 
Christianity. For Smith, one effective remedy ‘is the study of science and philosophy, 
which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more 
than middling rank and fortune … [because] [s]cience is the great antidote to the poison 
of enthusiasm and superstition’ (WN, p. 796). Smith’s second remedy is the provision 
of what he calls ‘publick diversions’, the aim of which is ‘to amuse and divert the peo-
ple by painting, poetry, musick, dancing; by all sorts of dramatic representations and 
exhibitions, would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy 
and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and 
enthusiasm’ (WN, p. 796; cf. Haakonssen, 2006, p. 20).
9. Steuart published his economic treatise An Inquiry into the Principles of Political 
Oeconomy in 1767, after TMS and before WN.
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